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The Political Ontology of Race
Michael Rabinder James
Bucknell University
Race theory is dominated by two camps. Eliminativists rely on a biological
ontology, which contends that the concept of race must be biologically grounded, in
order to repudiate the very term, on grounds that it is epistemologically vacuous
and normatively pernicious. Conservationists use a social ontology, in which race is
based on social practices, in order to retain racial categories in remedial social
policies, such as affirmative action and race-based political representation. This
article attempts to reorient this debate in two ways. First, it challenges the idea that
racial identity is entirely unchosen by defending a political ontology of race that,
unlike the biological and social ontologies, affirms the role of non-white agency in
determining the political salience of ascribed racial identity. It then transcends the
normative impasse between eliminativism and conservationism by contending that
all three ontologies are potentially valuable and dangerous, depending on where
they are applied. The biological ontology is defensible for evolutionary and medical
research, the social ontology for affirmative action and anti-discrimination policy,
and the political ontology for political representation.
Polity (2012) 44, 106–134. doi:10.1057/pol.2011.15; published online 17 October 2011
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Tommie Shelby
In the sit-ins, the marches, the jailhouse songs, I saw the African-American
community becoming more than just the place where you’d been born or the
house where you’d been raised. Through organizing, through shared sacrifice,
membership had been earned. And because membership was earned . . . I
believed that it might, over time, admit the uniqueness of my own life.
Barack Obama1
On November 4, 2008, America elected Barack Obama to be its first black
president. Or did it? Not according to Marie Arana, whose headline in the
Washington Post screamed, “He’s not Black.” Arana argues that because his
The author thanks Amy McCready, Tom Merrill, Joshua Preiss, and Andrew Valls for providing
valuable criticisms of earlier drafts of this essay. All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the
author.
1. Barack Obama, Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance, rev. ed. (New York: Three
Rivers Press, 2004), 134–35.
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mother was white, “Barack Obama is not our first black president. He is our first
biracial, bicultural president.” Unless Americans still “hew to the racist rule” of
hypo-descent, whereby any African ancestry makes a person black, Obama
is better understood as an interracial “mutt,” like many American Hispanics,
including Arana herself, the child of “a white Kansan mother and a foreign
[Peruvian] father.”2
Yet Arana’s insight is not as radical she thinks. Calling Obama “biracial”
assumes that his father and mother were of distinct, discrete races. But is this
really the case? Do distinct black and white races really exist? Were Obama born
to two Kenyans studying in Hawai’i, would he still be “black”? To answer such
questions, we must determine what defines the category “black” as a subcategory of “human.” We must identify the defining properties of this sub-set and
determine whether they are necessary, and sufficient to encompass certain
individuals from Kenya, Congo, Capetown, and Chicago. In short, we must ask the
question, “What is black?”
This is an ontological question. It addresses the being, the very existence, of a
category of humans distinct from other humans. Today, two approaches dominate
discussions of the ontology of race. According to biological ontology, preeminent
for most of the history of the idea of race, the world is divided “into a small
number of groups, called ‘races,’ in such a way that the members of these groups
shared certain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural
characteristics with one another that they did not share with members of any
other race.” Each discrete race purportedly has its own essence, or a set of
“characteristics that were necessary and sufficient, taken together, for someone to
be a member of the race.”3 Although Arana’s depiction of Obama as “biracial”
most likely rejects the “moral, intellectual, and cultural” characteristics of this
position, her presupposition of discrete and inheritable racial categories belies a
commitment to a milder, egalitarian, but still biological ontology of race.
While Arana’s article nicely exemplifies the widespread and persistent use
of biological ontology as a “folk theory” within American racial discourse,
the scientific status of racial essentialism has been questioned by scholars.
In response, some defenders of the existence of races have adopted a social
ontology. According to this view, the division of humanity into distinct and
discrete races is a social construction, created and sustained by humans.
Beginning with the Spanish Inquisition’s investigation of the purity of blood of
Jewish and Muslim converts to Christianity, European elites have grouped people
according to their ancestry, in order to grant or deprive them of certain benefits.4
2. Marie Arana, “He’s Not Black,” Washington Post, November 30, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/28/AR2008112802219.html (last accessed February 27, 2009).
3. K. Anthony Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections,” in Anthony Appiah
and Amy Gutmann, Color Conscious (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 54–55.
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As European explorers and soldiers conquered Africa, Asia, and the Americas,
European thinkers categorized the people they encountered into “races” and
attributed to them the traits associated with biological ontology. Despite the
decline in the scientific status of racial essentialism, biological folk theories of
race persist, often to the detriment but sometimes to the benefit of members of
non-white populations. So even if according to many scientists today, discrete,
essentialist races are biologically unreal, they remain socially real, with real costs
and benefits.
Each of these two ontologies tends to be associated with a specific normative
position on race. Biological ontology can lead to a reaction, racial “eliminativism,”
according to the following logic: (1) at one time, races were understood to reflect
inherited biological essences, which manifest themselves in certain physical and
behavioral traits; (2) these bio-behavioral phenotypes were used to justify the
ranking of the races, with whites atop the racial hierarchy; (3) laws, policies, and
social norms were developed that distinguished among the races, with whites
receiving preferential treatment over non-whites; (4) we now know that races are
not biological entities, and that racial essences do not exist; (5) therefore, we
must dispose of the concept of race and, if not immediately then at least
eventually, we must dispose of laws, policies, and social norms that differentiate
among non-existent races.5 In contrast, social ontology can prompt the normative
position of racial “conservationism” through this reasoning: (1) people
constructed the notion of races in the past and maintain the notion
in the present; (2) as a result, individuals are placed into racial categories
by a combination of formal laws and informal social behaviors, by members of
both the dominant white and the subordinate non-white racial categories;
(3) this unchosen racial categorization leads members of subordinate, non-white
races to suffer social disadvantages; (4) therefore, the notion of races must be
conserved in at least some laws, policies, and social norms to counteract
the unchosen social disadvantages suffered by subordinate, non-white races.6
The result, I believe, is a normative impasse between eliminativism and
conservationism, even though proponents of biological and social ontology
actually agree on a wide range of conclusions, such as the falsity of racial
essentialism, its widespread and mistaken usage, and the real disadvantages
suffered by those ascribed as non-white.7
4. Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott, “Introduction,” in The Idea of Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi
and Tommy L. Lott (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000), vii; Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in
the West (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 122–26; George Frederickson,
Racism: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002), 31–35.
5. This portrait of eliminativism draws on Michael Hardimon, “The Ordinary Concept of Race,” The
Journal of Philosophy 100 (September 2003): 454–55.
6. For an argument of this type, see Paul Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncompleted Argument: DuBois and the
Reality of Race,” Social Theory and Practice 26 (Spring 2000): 103–28.
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But there is an additional area of consensus. The proponents of both
normative positions view race as an unchosen identity. They deny the role of
human agency, at least on the part of members of subordinate, non-white racial
groups. Whereas the theory of inheritable essences eliminates agency within
biological ontology, agency is constrained within social ontology by the
aggregate behavior of individuals and groups within society. Individuals cannot
consciously choose their race because others, consciously or unconsciously,
choose it for them.
In this essay, I wish to reorient the ontological and normative discussion of
race in two ways. First, I challenge the idea that racial identity is entirely
unchosen by defending a political ontology of race. Unlike the biological
and social ontologies, the political ontology presumes that people of color are
agents who can choose the political salience of their unchosen racial identities. I
build on Tommie Shelby’s argument that although non-white individuals are
regularly ascribed to thin racial identities by biological or social forces beyond
their control, they retain some freedom to respond to their categorization and to
adopt for either cultural or political reasons a thick racial identity. I synthesize
Shelby’s approach to race with Hannah Arendt’s and Mark Warren’s understandings of political agency and political relations, and thereby articulate a
political ontology of race, wherein individuals choose a thick racial identity for
political purposes (to secure binding collective decisions enforced by power)
and under political conditions (of pluralism and conflict among perspectives and
interests).
In addition, I seek to transcend the normative impasse between eliminativism
and conservationism by recognizing the partial validity and interconnectedness
of all three ontologies: biological, social, and political. I argue that instead of
debating whether to maintain the concept of race, we ought to assess the relative
advantages and disadvantages of different race concepts for different human
problems. In other words, all three ontologies of race may be beneficially applied
in some contexts but dangerously misapplied in others. The key normative
question, therefore, is not whether to retain the concept of race, but how to
identify the appropriate domain for each type of racial ontology. I will propose
using the biological ontology for evolutionary research and some types of
medical treatment, the social ontology for affirmative action and antidiscrimination policy, and the political ontology for the political representation
of racial minorities.

7. Ron Mallon, “Race: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic,” Ethics 116 (April 2006): 545.
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Biological Ontology and Eliminativism
According to biological ontology, the concept of race typically signifies the
division of humanity into a small number (4–5) of discrete groups8 based upon
four criteria: (1) a biological foundation, be it Aristotelian essences or modern
genes, that is necessary and sufficient for determining an individual’s race;
(2) the inheritance of the foundation from forebears, that allows competent
observers to identify an individual’s race through her ancestry or genealogy;
(3) an identifiable geographic home, typically in Africa, Europe, Asia, or North
and South America, from which the biological foundation arises; (4) and the
manifestation of the biological foundation mainly in physical phenotypes, such
as skin color, eye shape, hair texture, and bone structure, and perhaps also in
behavioral phenotypes, such as intelligence or delinquency. For much of its
history, the users of the idea of biological race have ranked the races according to
their phenotypes, with the white or European race on the top.9
Naomi Zack succinctly summarizes the modern critique of the biological
ontology of race. Early modern philosophers had discredited Aristotelian
essences, which were used to ground distinct species and later distinct human
races. Whereas present-day folk theories rely on geography to divide humanity
into African, European, Asian, and Amerindian races, according to contemporary
population genetics, geographically based environmental stimuli lead to
continuous rather than discrete physical differences, while mitochondrial DNA
mutations provide evidence of the geographical origins of populations but do not
correlate with the physical traits of racial groups. Similarly, phenotypes cannot
satisfactorily ground folk theories of race, because physical differences, such as
skin tone, hair texture, and bone structure are gradual, not discrete. Race cannot
be founded upon transmission genetics because the genes that are transmitted
between generations lead to very specific physical traits, not to general racial
characteristics shared by all members of a putatively racial group. And finally,
genealogy cannot ground race because even though clades (populations
descended from a common ancestor) may have common genetic characteristics,
these need not correlate with the visible traits associated with races.10
Eliminativists often cite such problems with biological ontology in order to
repudiate the concept of race as epistemologically vacuous and normatively

8. Although the idea of race has usually referred to a small number of groups, the volatility of the
race concept is demonstrated by the widely varying numbers of races (from four to sixty-three) that are
said to exist. See Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, Ethnicity and Race (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine
Forge Press, 1998), 21.
9. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity”; Naomi Zack, Philosophy of Science and Race (New York:
Routledge, 2002).
10. Zack, Philosophy of Science and Race, 87–88.
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pernicious. They contend that the concept of race (or the existence of discrete
groups based on essentialist or genetic differences associated with geography,
genealogy, and phenotype) can refer only to reproductively isolated groups (the
Amish or Irish Protestants) but not to its typical referents (black, white, Asian, and
Amerindian). There is a mismatch between the logic of race theory and its
application.11 Normatively, the concept of race should be eradicated in order to
undermine the popular belief in a racial hierarchy that is grounded in biological
ontology. As Michael Hardimon puts it: “No race, no racism.”12
However, racial eliminativism confronts its own epistemological, ontological,
and normative problems. Although most scientists agree that discrete, essentialist
races do not exist, the rejection of the criteria of discreteness and essentialism
would also invalidate distinctions between non-human species, such as lions and
tigers. As Philip Kitcher puts it, “there is no . . . genetic feature . . . that separates
one species of mosquito or mushroom from another.”13 Rather, biological species
arise from reproductive isolation, which is relative, not absolute (since hybrids
sometimes appear in nature); which may have non-genetic causes (for example,
geographic separation and incompatible reproduction periods or rituals); which
may generate statistically significant if not uniform genetic differences; and
which may express distinct phenotypes. In effect, if one argues that the failure to
satisfy the conditions of discreteness and essentialism requires jettisoning
the concept of race, then one must argue that it also requires jettisoning the
concept of biological species. But because the concept of biological species
remains epistemologically useful, some biologists and philosophers use it to
defend a racial ontology that is “biologically informed but non-essentialist.”14
The revised racial ontology is vague, non-discrete, yet based upon genetics,
genealogy, geography, and phenotype.
There are three versions of this new biological ontology of race: cladistic
race; socially isolated race; and genetically clustered race. Cladistic races are
“ancestor-descendant sequences of breeding populations that share a common
origin.”15 Allegedly, these races emerged during human evolution, as different
groups of humans became geographically isolated from each other. Moreover,
they may be dying out (if they have not done so already) due to more recent
11. See Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 73; Zack, Philosophy of Science and Race, 69; Mallon,
“Race,” 526, 533.
12. Hardimon, “The Ordinary Concept of Race,” 455.
13. Philip Kitcher, “Does ‘Race’ Have a Future?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (Autumn 2007):
294–96.
14. Nevan Sesardic, “Race: A Social Destruction of a Biological Concept,” Biology and Philosophy 25,
No. 2 (March 2010): 146; Cf. Ron Mallon, “Human Categories beyond Non-essentialism,” Journal of
Political Philosophy 15(November 2007): 146–18.
15. Robin Andreasen, “The Cladistic Race Concept: A Defense,” Biology and Philosophy 19 (June
2004): 425.
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human reproductive intermingling.16 Socially isolated race refers to the
conjecture that legal sanctions against miscegenation might have created a
genetically isolated African American race in the U.S.A.17 Finally, defenders of
genetically clustered race argue that although only 7 percent of the differences
between any two individuals regarding any one specific gene can be attributed to
their membership in one of the commonly recognized racial categories, the
aggregation of several genes is statistically related to a small number of racial
categories associated with major geographic regions and phenotypes.18
Can these new biological ontologies of race avoid the mismatches that
epistemologically undermined the original biological ontology of race? The short
answer is that they can, but only through human intervention. The theory of a
socially isolated race faces no mismatch when applied to descendants of African
slaves brought to the United States. However, this racial category would not
encompass black Africans, such as Obama’s father, and thus would exclude
the President as well. And because African American race originated in legally
enforced sexual segregation, it is “both biologically real and socially constructed.”19
On first glance, genetic clustering would seem to provide an objective,
biological foundation for a broader racial taxonomy. But differences in clustered
genes are continuous, not discrete. Thus scientists must decide where to draw the
line between one genetically clustered race and another. If they program their
computers to distinguish four genetic clusters, then European, Asian, Amerindian,
and African groups will emerge; but if they seek only two clusters, then only the
African and Amerindian “races” remain.20 Thus, genetic clustering avoids racial
mismatch only through the decisions of the scientist analyzing the data.
The same problem confronts the idea of cladistic race. The number of races
will vary from nine, at the most recent period of evolutionary reproductive
isolation, to just one, if we go back to the very beginning (because all humans
were originally Africans). In addition, the concept of cladistic race faces a
stronger mismatch by “cross-classifying” groups that we typically think of as part
of the same race—for example by linking northeast Asians more closely with
Europeans than with more phenotypically similar southeast Asians. Robin
Andreasen defends the cladistic concept with the argument that folk theories of
race have themselves generated counter-intuitive cross-classifications, particularly with respect to the Census’s Asian category, which previously excluded Asian
16. Robin Andreasen, “A New Perspective on the Race Debate,” British Journal of the Philosophy of
Science 49 (June 1998): 214–16; Cf. Robin Andreasen, “Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?”
Philosophy of Science 67, Supplement (September 2000): S653–66.
17. Philip Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” in Racism, ed. Leonard Harris (New York:
Humanity Books, 1999).
18. Sesardic, “Race”; Kitcher, “Does Race have a Future?” 304.
19. Kitcher, “Does Race have a Future?” 298.
20. Ibid., 304.
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Indians and now excludes native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders.21 But her
argument is hardly compelling, since the U.S. Census’s history of shifting racial
categories and past use of ethnic and religious terms (such as Filipino, Hindu,
and Korean) to signify races is typically taken as evidence of the social, rather
than biological, foundations of race.22
In each case, the second generation of biological ontology encounters problems when trying to demarcate discrete boundaries between different biological
populations. If discreteness is indispensable to a human racial taxonomy, then
mismatches can be avoided, if at all, only through human intervention, which
lends an element of social ontology to the revised versions of biological ontology.
But as noted above, biological species also are not genetically discrete, and
therefore boundaries between non-human species must also be imposed through
human intervention. Furthermore, in the next section I will show that the social
ontology of race itself confronts mismatches regarding Asian “race” and admits of
non-discrete scalar race concepts. So, biological ontology need not demand
eliminativism, since non-discrete biological races are no less coherent than nondiscrete non-human biological species.
Moreover, racial eliminativism makes an unsupported assertion about the
normative consequences that flow from the logic of biological ontology. First, as
Michael Hardimon notes, the “ordinary concept of race,” which groups humans
according to phenotype, ancestry, and geography but need not be essentialist, is
logically separate from the idea of racist hierarchy, even though historically the
two emerged together. Thus, the eliminativist claim that we must first discard a
biological understanding of race in order to eradicate racism logically fails, since
a world with the biological concept of race but without racism is logically
possible. Indeed, this seems to be the presupposition behind the Arana article
discussed above.23 Second, social scientists have observed that racist sentiments
can persist in America without those holding such views being committed to a
biological understanding of race. According to studies of “new racism,” many
white Americans reject biologically grounded racial differences but retain
prejudices based upon putative black cultural traits.24 The fact that all black

21. Robin Andreasen, “The Meaning of ‘Race’: Folk Conceptions and the New Biology of Race,” The
Journal of Philosophy 102 (February 2005): 100–01; Andreasen, “The Cladistic Race Concept: A Defense,”
430–31; Joshua Glasgow, “On the New Biology of Race,” The Journal of Philosophy 100 (September 2003):
456–74.
22. Yen Le Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992),
Chapter 5.
23. Hardimon, “The Ordinary Concept of Race.”
24. Robert Entman and Andrew Rojecki, The Black Image in the White Mind (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 2000); Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and
Democratic Ideals (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without
Racists, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).
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Americans do not share a common culture is irrelevant to many whites who
attribute a common dysfunctional culture to blacks. This involuntary imposition of
a common culture onto individuals marked by physical phenotypes and ancestry is
exactly what makes the new racism a genuine form of racism: members of the
putatively dysfunctional culture are identified by their bodies and ancestry, rather
than by any purely cultural marker, such as language, religion, or ritual. So contra
eliminativism, both the ordinary concept of race and the new racism show that we
can have race without racism and racism without race.
Instead of eliminating the biological understanding of race, we might do better by
reflecting carefully on how and when different types of racial concepts are useful,
useless, or dangerous. In her defense of the cladistic notion of race, Andreasen calls
“for the relative autonomy of the scientific and folk meanings of ‘race’.”25 In her view,
a cladistic race concept that divides northeastern from southeastern Asians is
scientifically useful for evolutionary research, while a folk concept that is grounded
in the social ontology of race may be useful in the development of antidiscrimination
law. Likewise, the concepts of genetically clustered and socially isolated race are
arguably useful in the detection and treatment of some health problems.26 Of course,
biological-race concepts can be applied in dangerous ways, but so too can socialrace concepts, along with non-racial group concepts related to religion, ethnicity,
and culture. The pressing theoretical task is to determine when and where the
benefits of these concepts outweigh their costs.

Social Ontology and Conservationism
Charles Mills coined the term “the social ontology of race” to reveal the
philosophical import of racial categorization, something not captured by the
25. Andreasen, “The Meaning of ‘Race,” 102.
26. Ian Hacking offers a defense for the provisional use of American racial categories in medicine.
He contends that racial categories need not reflect essentialist, uniform differences, and that there
are statistically significant genetic differences among different racial groups. As a result, an African
American is more likely to find a bone marrow match from a pool of African American donors than from
a pool of white or Asian American donors. Hacking therefore defends the practice of soliciting African
American bone marrow donors, even though this may provide fodder to racist groups who defend an
essentialist and hierarchical conception of biological race. Ian Hacking, “Why Race Still Matters,”
Daedelus 134 (Winter 2005): 102–16; Cf. Kitcher, “Does Race have a Future?” 312–16. Dorothy Roberts
emphasizes the dangers of using racial categories within medicine, and suggests that it not only validates
egregious ideas of biological racial hierarchy but also contributes to conservative justifications for
limiting race-based affirmative action and even social welfare funding, which supposedly would be
wasted on genetically inferior minority populations. In effect, race-based medicine raises the specter of
the a new political synthesis of colorblind conservatism with biological racialism. Dorothy Roberts, “Is
Race-based Medicine Good for Us? African American Approaches to Race, Biomedicine, and Equality,”
Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 36, (Fall 2008): 537–45. Roberts, however, fails to engage the
literature on the statistical significance of racial categories for genetic differences. Moreover, she herself
acknowledges that many versions of colorblind conservatism do not rely at all on biological
justifications. She thus reminds us that we can have racism without race.
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social scientific term “the social construction of race.”27 The term conveys that
race is ontologically real on a social level, regardless of its biological status.28
Mallon distinguishes between and labels three aspects of the social ontology
of race.29 Thin constructivism refers to the ascription of individuals to racial
categories through various criteria, seven of which are proffered by Mills: physical
appearance, ancestry, self-awareness of ancestry, public awareness of ancestry,
culture, experience, and self-identification.30 Interactive kind constructivism
denotes that once individuals are categorized according to race, they are likely
to have different experiences (for instance, childhood poverty and police
brutality) that render races as “probabilistically defined populations” with
“differential life chances.”31 Finally, institutional constructivism signifies race as a
social institution that coordinates multiple individual actions through convention, not nature, and thus is durable but limited to the specific societies in which
it is embedded.
Paul Taylor illuminates the institutionalization of race by comparing it to
money. Like race, money is not natural but conventional: “It is ontologically [inter]
subjective” and thus “depends for its existence on human agreements.” The
“institutional fact” of money is valid only within specific local contexts. It would be
useless among “Stone Age people, or a camp of radical Luddites.” But once money
is established, its institutional durability hinders attempts by individuals to reject or
alter this convention: “I can’t just decide, unilaterally, that my green pieces of paper
will be worth a thousand dollars each.” So, too, with race:
Race is in these respects like money. Race-thinking varies from society to
society, which shows that it depends on local human conventions for its

27. Charles Mills, Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1998), 47–48, 209. Mills distinguishes between the neutral, social scientific concept of “the social
construction of race” and the radical concept of “racial constructivism,” which emphasizes the political
motivations that led white Westerners to divide humanity into races in the first place. But the authors he
cites as progenitors of the neutral concept acknowledge the political animus behind the social
construction of race. Thus, his conceptual distinction is not particularly revealing. See Michael Omi and
Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994).
28. Here I depart from Mills’s own preferred terminology. Working within the terminological domain
of analytical metaphysics, Mills (45–49) distinguishes two forms of “objectivism”: “realism” (the position
that entities “exist or do not exist independently of human consensus or dissent”) and “constructivism”
(“an objective ontological status is involved which arises out of intersubjectivity”). Taylor distinguishes
“real” from “objective,” holding that races are socially “real” (through intersubjective agreement that
constrains individual subjectivity) if not “objective” (“valid . . . from any [specific society’s]
perspective”). I adopt Taylor’s terminology because it reflects the distinction between inter-subjectivity
and objectivity convincingly made by hermeneutic thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg
Gadamer. Taylor, Race: A Philosophical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 89–92.
29. Mallon “Race,” 534–36.
30. Mills, Blackness Visible, 50–54.
31. Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncompleted Argument,”6; Taylor, Race, 86.
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existence. But once the conventions are established . . . then there are facts
that exist independently of any individual’s particular judgments and beliefs. I
can’t just decide, unilaterally, that my dark skin and curly hair mark me as
white, or as having no race.32
Just as the possession of money, or the lack thereof, has real social effects on
individuals, so, too, does the possession of a racial identity. In America,
possessing a white racial identity is like having real money, and all of its
advantages.33 Possessing a black racial identity is almost like having anti-money.
Its possession purchases only the disadvantages of interactive-kind constructivism. Precisely for this reason, proponents of the social ontology of race defend
racial “conservationism” and such policies as affirmative action, which
compensate for the anti-money of black racial identity.
The money analogy allows Taylor both to convey the durability of race as a
social institution, and to convey individuals’ limited control over racial identity.
He thus connects social ontology and racial conservationism for remedial
purposes. However, the money analogy also reveals how race can be influenced
by human agency if we extend the analogy to two other monetary phenomena:
inflation and counterfeit. Mallon notes that according to some philosophers of
social science, money constitutes a “natural kind” for the science of economics,
akin to natural kinds in biology. This, of course, reinforces the realism sought by
advocates of the social ontology of race. It also raises the possibility of inflation,
another “natural kind” for economists.34 Inflation, however, often results from
intentional political decisions. There is nothing natural about Zimbabwe’s present
astronomical levels of inflation. They are the direct result of political decisions by
Robert Mugabe, who prints money to finance his government and thereby
devalues the currency. Apart from this extreme case, monetary policy can
encourage both inflation and deflation.35 So, if inflation can be influenced by
human choice and political action, we should then ask whether we can inflate

32. Taylor, Race, 90–91.
33. The idea that white racial identity has a real, pecuniary value has a long lineage. Recall Homer
Plessy, who in his famous attempt to remain seated in a whites-only rail car contended not only that he
was white, but that his white racial identity represented a form of property of which the Louisiana
segregation statute deprived him. The Supreme Court agreed that white race was property, but rejected
Plessy’s claim because, according to Louisiana law, Plessy was not white, even though he had three white
grandparents. The Court presumably would have held that Plessy had been deprived of property if Plessy
had been white and forced to sit in a colored rail car. See Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537, 549.
Cheryl Harris provides a fascinating account of the property value of perceived white racial identity
through an analysis of racial passing. Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” in Critical Race Theory, ed.,
Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas. (New York: The New Press, 1995).
34. Mallon, “Human Categories beyond Essentialism,” 155–56.
35. Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000).
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the social understanding of race, perhaps by applying it to too many groups and
thereby debasing its value.
Consider the notion of an Asian American race. Taylor, when defining race as
a probability category, notes that according to the 2000 Census, poverty afflicted
only 7 percent of Caucasian Americans but 11 percent of Asian Americans (and
over 20 percent of African, Latino/a, and Native Americans). Similarly, he notes
that white median household income was $4,000 above that of Asian Americans
(and at least $13,000 higher than that of Blacks, Latino/a, and Native
Americans).36 But one is struck by enormous differences in household income
within the Asian American racial category. According to 2004 Census figures,
Asian-Indian and Filipino American households had median incomes of $68,771
and $65,700, respectively, whereas those of Vietnamese and Korean American
households were only $45,980 and $43,195, respectively. Similarly, poverty rates
among Asian American ethnic groups varied enormously (5.2 percent for Filipino
Americans, 9.7 percent for Indian Americans, 14.0 percent for Vietnamese
Americans, and 14.9 percent for Korean Americans).37 Ethnicity rather than race
seems to be the appropriate probability marker. Taylor criticizes the “model
minority” racialization of Asian Americans for “obscuring . . . the differences
between relatively affluent Japanese immigrants, and relatively disadvantaged
Vietnamese communities,” and for overlooking the possible causes of the high
median household incomes of Asian Americans, such as high levels of
professionalization and large family size. He also rightly notes the problem of
“outsider racialization” faced by all Asian ethnic groups.38 Yet he never assesses
the usefulness of the term “race,” even as a social construction, for encompassing
such a diverse population.
By applying the term race to sociologically diverse populations, we might not
only “inflate” and devalue the term but also occlude fruitful policy responses.
Indeed, if we investigate some possible causes for intra-racial but inter-ethnic
income differentials among Asian Americans, we find that even ethnicity is not
always useful. For instance, the high income of Asian-Indian Americans is clearly
related to their generally high levels of educational attainment, whereas the much
lower incomes of Vietnamese Americans correlate with their generally lower
levels of formal education. A focus on ethnicity—understood as an inherited
identity based on culture—might lead one to assume that Indian culture
emphasizes education, which explains the professional success of this group, as
36. Taylor, Race, 81. There are some problems with Taylor’s data. I could not verify his data on the
incomes of Asian Americans, and the 2004 Census places Asian American median household income
($56, 231) above that of non-Hispanic Whites ($48,784). Asian Community Survey 2004, 17 (http://
www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/acs-05.pdf).
37. Asian Community Survey 2004, 17–18.
38. Taylor, Race, 145.
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opposed to a less educationally oriented Vietnamese culture. But this ethnicitybased explanation is less convincing given that only 50 percent of the population
in India is literate. A better explanation lies with immigration policy. Most
Indians who immigrated to the United States were admitted through skill-based
employment visas, whereas most Vietnamese arrived via refugee status.39
In effect, immigration policy selected and admitted only well-educated Indians,
which has contributed to their high median educational and income levels,
whereas immigration policy did not sift the best-educated Vietnamese
immigrants, yielding an immigrant population with a wider range of skills and
earning potential. Consequently, a race-based affirmative action policy for higher
education that lumped all Asian Americans together would fail to increase
significantly the admission of relatively disadvantaged Vietnamese Americans,
even though their educational status would suggest that they, like blacks and
Latinos/as, are underrepresented in the halls of academia.
A way to deal with the problem of racial inflation might be Lawrence Blum’s
“scalar” approach, which treats racialization as “a matter of degree.” According to
Blum, African Americans and Caucasian Americans are completely racialized,
partly because many black and white Americans accept such racialization, and
partly because these identities so strongly structure the life chances of their
members. Conversely, Asian Americans are incompletely racialized, partly
because they do not fully accept the racial identity attributed to them by others,
and partly because the legal racial category of Asian American includes South
Asian ethnicities (for example, Indians and Pakistanis) that differ phenotypically
from East Asian ethnic groups (for example, Vietnamese and Chinese). Because
East Asians and South Asians “are not generally regarded as the same racial
group,” Blum suggests two responses: “a racialized group . . . that omits South
Asians; and a panethnic group that includes South Asians.”40 A scalar approach to
race thus addresses the inflation and devaluation of the race concept, which will
have different levels of value when applied to different groups.41

39. Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity, 98.
40. Lawrence Blum, I’m not a Racist, But . . . The Moral Quandary of Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2002, 148–54. Latinos/as are similarly incompletely racialized due to two countervailing
forces. On the one hand, Latino/a legal categorization can include racial identities—white, black, Asian,
or native American—with strong phenotypical differences, thereby lessening the racial character of this
group. On the other hand, most individuals of Latin American descent in the United States share similar
skin tones, a history of colonization and conquest, and past and present discrimination based on visible
characteristics and imputed cultural traits.
41. Blum, 163, uses scalar race to further the eliminativist position that “[r]aces . . . simply do not
exist,” even if scalar racialized groups do. Like Appiah, he argues that the term race can only apply to
discrete, inheritable groups, not the continuous and fuzzy categories of scalar racialized identities. But,
as I argued earlier, a biological ontology based on the species concept can admit of races that are not
discrete and thus mitigate the contrast between scalar racialized groups and races. For this reason,
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Blum applies his scalar understanding not only to groups but also to
individuals. Just as some groups can be more racialized than others, so too can
individuals. For instance, an individual can identify more or less strongly with the
dominant culture within a racial group; she can seek friendships primarily within
her racial group; or she can adopt “political values taken as appropriate to [her]
racial group.” Since each dimension of racial scalarity is distinct, a “black person
can be socially ‘more black’ but politically ‘less black’.”42 In contrast to Taylor’s
vision of the social ontology of race (in which individuals are completely unable
to influence their racial identities), a scalar understanding of race implies a
degree of agency on the part of racialized individuals. Their appearance and
ancestry locates them within an established and widely accepted racial category
(what Mallon had called thin constructivism). Yet, they still retain some agency in
the sense that they can choose what to make of that unchosen racial ascription.
We can understand the space for agency if we extend the money analogy to
the phenomenon of counterfeit, which resembles the racial phenomenon of
passing. Both counterfeit bills and blacks with “white” features have characteristics that belie their genealogy and thus their “true” status. Just as “a molecule for
molecule duplicate” of a ten dollar bill would still “be counterfeit because it lacks
a certain kind of historical relation that a genuine bill has (it was not printed by
the U.S. Mint),”43 so too an individual with African ancestry but white features
would be “passing” because that person’s ancestors did not come from Europe.
Moreover, counterfeiters and race passers exercise agency. One can choose to
pass counterfeit bills, and one can choose to pass by hiding one’s racial ancestry.
Mills develops the notion of “self-awareness of ancestry” to distinguish
unintentional passing, simply by looking white without knowing one’s African
heritage, from conscious passing, when one knows and intentionally hides her
racial background. Mills also develops two categories of self-identification to
distinguish two uses of agency. “Conscious episodic passing” refers to the
decision to pass temporarily for strategic reasons but to continue to self-identify
as black. “Conscious passing . . . for ultimate assimilation” occurs when one
hides one’s African heritage in order to be classified permanently as white.44
Mills uses the above distinction to illustrate the ontological, metaphysical, and
epistemic problems associated with racial identity. But there are important
normative questions as well, which can be seen when we return to the analogy
with money. An egalitarian might excuse and forgive a desperately poor person
Blum’s idea of scalar race poses a bigger problem for defenders of a social ontology of race that requires
discrete, social categories of white, black, Asian, and other races.
42. Blum, I’m not a Racist, But, 161.
43. Ron Mallon, “Passing, Traveling and Reality: Social Constructionism and the Metaphysics of
Race,” Nous 38 (December 2004): 655.
44. Mills, Blackness Visible, 55–59.
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who knowingly passes counterfeit money in order to survive, and simultaneously
reprimand an affluent counterfeiter who is simply greedy. Similarly, a black
activist might excuse one person for engaging in “conscious episodic passing” to
obtain a decent job in a labor market infused with racial prejudices, and chide
another person for “consciously passing in order to assimilate” on either the
cultural ground of inauthenticity, the moral ground of reinforcing white
supremacy, or the political ground of diluting black voting strength. Although I
do not wish to assess any of these normative arguments here, they appear to merit
inquiry. Moreover, their potential salience can be perceived in Mills’s contrast
between conscious, assimilationist passing versus the eliminativist refusal to
identify with any race. A person practicing the latter does not hide her African
ancestry and openly challenges the hierarchical system of racial classification,
whereas the assimilationist, by identifying as white, obliquely reinforces both
the social desirability (the money) of whiteness and the social undesirability
(the anti-money) of blackness.
The role of agency and normative evaluation within the social ontology of
race raises a broader theoretical point. Race, like money, is a social fact upheld
by widespread intersubjective agreements that individuals acting alone cannot
unilaterally dismiss. But although isolated individuals cannot negate institutional
facts like race and money, they potentially can affect institutional facts if they
act collectively. The complete elimination of money might not be in the offing,
but collective political action can limit what money can buy. For example, the
elimination of slavery means that money can no longer buy you a person.
The variety of prostitution laws mean that while money can’t buy you love, it can
legally buy you sex in various European countries and in Nevada, but not in the
rest of the United States. Decisions about the use of money are ultimately political
and therefore are made through collective agency and entail normative
justification. Agency and justification need not be confined to formal legislative
settings, as is attested by the frequent presence of social movements in politics.
But collective agency and normative justification remain indispensable to
political decisionmaking. And just as they limit what money can buy, so too
can they limit the uses of race. The civil rights movement negated the use
of social understandings of race to enforce de jure segregation, even if it could
not fully negate the use of race in upholding other forms of racial hierarchy.
Hannah Arendt, perhaps more than any other modern thinker, highlighted the
distinction between unconscious social interactions and conscious, intentional,
political ones. According to Arendt, social behavior is characterized by a lack of
intentional agency. This is exemplified by the idea of market behavior. Classical
economists, such as Adam Smith, famously invoked the image of an “invisible
hand” to portray how markets can compel the production of socially beneficial
outcomes (“public virtue”) out of personal self-interest (“private vice”) and to
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disclose the unintended relationship between the self-seeking intentions of
individuals and firms and the advancement of the public good. Political action, on
the other hand, is the conscious exercise of agency to bring about certain
changes in public affairs.45 This does not mean that humans can magically create
new states of affairs ex nihilo. Arendt emphasizes that humans, “no matter what
they do, are always conditioned beings.” Their conditions are generated not only
by nature but also by human social behavior and political action.46 She also
acknowledges that individual agency will often, perhaps usually, fail to achieve its
goals and break the bonds of unintentional behavior, especially when
unintentional behavior has become institutionalized. The chances for success
are enhanced by collective political action, or “jointly taking intentional charge of
those results, effectively taking responsibility for them.” An isolated individual
incurs great costs when challenging an institutional structure; but when acting
“with a sufficient number of others, the individual participant can do a lot to alter
social structure.”47 Limits still apply, not least of them the “collective action
problem” of persuading individuals to accept short-term personal costs in order
to secure long term collective benefits.48 Nonetheless, the capacity for change
through intentional agency remains. Patterns of unintended social behavior
constrain us to some degree, but not entirely, since humans themselves are the
source of this constraint.
The topic of unintended social behavior returns us to the subject of race.
Social ontology holds that race is like money, an institutionalized fact. In fact,
race is institutionalized so deeply that many use the concept without thinking
about it, thereby reifying its existence through repeated behavior. Like money,
race is a social institution that individuals feel powerless to opt out of. But
perhaps new concepts, such as scalar race and typologies of passing, provide
some room for individual and collective agency. Perhaps they enable individuals
and groups to contest racial hierarchies and limit their domain, if not to eliminate
race entirely. If so, we may be able to speak of a political ontology of race wherein
race is not just an immutable social fact, but the un-level playing field of a
political contest.

45. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 41–44.
Mark Warren draws a similar contrast. He states that markets are not political because they “cannot
intend, think, interact, or argue . . . Deciding in the political sense requires references to intentionality,”
which “[b]ehavioral conceptions of politics define away.” Mark Warren, “What is Political?” Journal of
Theoretical Politics 11 (1999): 211.
46. Arendt, The Human Condition, 9.
47. Hanna Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 194–95.
48. For a compelling account of how black Americans overcame the collective action problem in
the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, see Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil
Rights Movement (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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Political Ontology and Racial Solidarity
According to the proposed political ontology of race, racial identity is not just
imposed upon individuals either biologically or socially. Racial identity also
reflects political action as people, individually or collectively, consciously bestow
additional significance to a racial identity that is biologically or socially imposed
on them. As such, political ontology presupposes intentional agency on the part of
racially ascribed individuals. Furthermore, because individuals can grant various
forms of apolitical significance to imposed racial identities, political ontology
entails the decisions by individuals to identify with their racial group for political
purposes (expressed through binding collective decisions enforced by power)
and under political conditions of pluralism and conflict (with respect to both
perspectives and interests).
As discussed above, intentional agency is a crucial component of Arendt’s
distinction between political action and social behavior. Mark Warren emphasizes
that political action, precisely because it presupposes intentional agency, requires
that actors justify the goals they pursue. And when political action is collective,
political actors must justify not only their goals but even the type of solidarity that
undergirds their collective action. Some forms of solidarity—exclusivist,
hierarchical, organic—may be harder to justify than others, particularly within
a democratic political context.49 Thus political action places a substantial burden
on political actors to justify what they want to change and how they go about
doing so.
While intentional agency is necessary for political ontology, it is hardly
sufficient. The notion of political ontology additionally involves plurality, conflict,
and power. Political action typically aims at collective decisions that are binding
and enforced by power. But even binding collective decisions are not political
if everybody is already in agreement. Politics (in Arendt’s understanding)
presupposes a plurality of interests and perspectives that potentially collide with
each other. Moreover, the conflicts must be manifest, not latent. Thus power must
be dispersed (to allow conflicts to emerge) without being negated (so that
binding collective decisions can be enforced, even against the will of some of the
participants). This is why many political theorists understand democracy, which
disperses power without eliminating it, as the most political of regimes.50

49. Warren, “What is Political?”
50. Arendt, The Human Condition, 7, 27–28, 57. Importantly, this portrait of power is both expansive
and restrictive. It is expansive because it can include not only the coercive power of the state but also
economic power of property relations and the cultural power to define meanings and identities. But it is
restrictive by focusing on the Weberian sense of “power over,” rather than the broader Foucauldian sense
of structuring power. This restriction is justifiable since even Foucault admits that different forms of
power reflect different types of human relationships, and the Weberian notion best reflects our intuitions
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For much of American and western history, there could be no true political
ontology of race because whites exercised sufficient power over non-whites to
suppress not only the latter’s agency but the expression of conflict among a
plurality of racial perspectives and interests. In effect, there was white racial
despotism; and the unilateral exercise of white power gave rise to the social, as
opposed to the political, ontology of race, because whites alone defined the
identity and status of non-whites.51 The question now is whether in twenty-firstcentury America the ontology of race is no longer only social or biological, no
longer only imposed, but also political and chosen. Does racial identity today not
only reflect hierarchical ascription but also intentional agency? Does it allow for
the expression of a plurality of interests and perspectives? Does it make manifest
previously suppressed conflicts? Is power sufficiently dispersed to allow nonwhites to choose their racial identity within an imperfect and unjust racial
democracy?
The work of Tommie Shelby, as I interpret it, provides a convincing portrait of a
political ontology of race that normatively prescribes neither the elimination of
race nor its mere conservation, but rather race-based political solidarity in
pursuit of racial justice. Just as Arendt begins by acknowledging that unchosen
biological and social conditions affect political action, Shelby begins with the
socially ontological condition of “thin blackness” that undergirds the political
ontology of race.
On a thin conception of black identity, “black” is a vague and socially imposed
category of difference that serves to distinguish groups on the basis of their
members having certain visible, inherited physical characteristics, and/or a
particular biological ancestry . . . . For those who meet the criterion, there is
little room for choice; you cannot simply decide not to be thinly black.

of how power functions within specifically political relationships. See Warren, “What is Political?”
215–19, 221.
51. My approach does not contradict Mills’s compelling ideas of the United States as a “Racial Polity”
and of “Global White Supremacy as a Political System.” Mills, Blackness Visible, 74–77; 98–106; 130–36.
Reading Mills through the framework of politics provided above, only whites could have been free to
engage in racial politics. Blacks and other non-whites were the objects upon which whites exercised
their agency. Mills rightly understands race “as a politically constructed categorization” (76), and that “the
decision as to where to draw the line [between different races] is politically motivated” (48). But in his
opinion, such politics were solely practiced by whites: “Westerners created race in the first place, by
demarcating themselves from other ‘races’”(xv). Similarly, my approach to politics coheres with his
portrait of “Herrenvolk ethics,” wherein whites extend towards other whites egalitarian respect and
recognition as persons, while simultaneously extending towards non-whites hierarchical disrespect and
negative recognition as sub-persons, resulting in “polities that are democratic for the master race, the
Herrenvolk, but not for the subordinate race(s)” (70–72; 159). Understood through my framework,
concepts like Herrenvolk ethics, the Racial Polity, and Global White Supremacy reflect whites freely
engaging in political action over non-whites while suppressing racial political action by non-whites.
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So, even though a thinly black individual with sufficient wealth could
assimilate into white culture, and another with sufficiently light skin and “white”
features could “pass” as white, the unchosen social conditions of physical
appearance or ancestry remain intact, leaving these people “vulnerable to
antiblack racism” despite their appearance, cultural assimilation, or class status.52
Shelby recognizes that while “a person cannot choose whether to be black in
the thin sense,” scalar race can allow her to “decide what significance she
will attach to her thin blackness.” Some blacks may “spontaneously embrace a
thick black [cultural] identity without treating this as a conscious strategy,”
whereas others may use their capacity for intentional agency and “deliberately
choose to cultivate a thick black identity.” At the other extreme, “one may choose
not to subjectively identify with the label ‘black’ or to conform to its associated
behavioral norms.” While an observer might criticize this choice as an
inauthentic form of racial self-hatred, the choice nonetheless might flow from
a consciously adopted eliminativist view that racial identity is “an inherently
invidious and repressive social distinction and, thus, should be repudiated on
political grounds.”53
In contrast to both the eliminativist rejection of blackness and the adoption of
a thick, black cultural identity, Shelby favors intentionally choosing “black
political solidarity . . . understood as black collective action in the interest of
racial justice.”54 Fearing that a thick black cultural identity would exacerbate
tensions within the black community rooted in gender, sexual orientation, class,
and ethnicity, Shelby instead advocates black political action “to remove or
mitigate the ideological and structural obstacles to the equal civic standing and
equal life chances of those who are socially classified as racially black.”55 Thin
blackness and the social vulnerabilities associated with it are the only things that
blacks unequivocally share. Shelby therefore recommends that black political
action should only pursue those interests “that blacks share on account of their
being black—fighting racism, promoting racial equality, eliminating racialized
poverty, and reducing racial antagonism.”56
Because black political solidarity is consciously chosen, political ontology
requires that black political actors justify both their political goals and their form
of solidarity to themselves and to others. This is feasible because this “political
mode of blackness,” unlike some “racial, ethnic, cultural, and national modes,”

52. Tommie Shelby, “Foundations of Black Solidarity: Collective Identity or Common Oppression,”
Ethics 112 (January 2002): 239–40.
53. Shelby,”Foundations of Black Solidarity,” 242–43.
54. Tommie Shelby, We Who are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 151.
55. Ibid., 150–51; Cf. Shelby, “Foundations of Black Solidarity,” 244–55.
56. Shelby, We Who are Dark, 154.
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adheres to widely justifiable “political principles, including anti-racism, equal
educational and employment opportunity, and tolerance for group differences
and individuality.”57 Whereas racial, ethnic, cultural, or national types of black
solidarity can be exclusive and difficult to justify within a liberal-democratic
context, black political solidarity based on universalistic “political principles can
and ought to be embraced with transparency and on the basis of rationally
motivated consensus.”58 Indeed, it is the universalistic justifiability of black
political solidarity, not the unchosen condition of thin black social identity,
that distinguishes politically mobilized blacks from a mere “interest group.” Black
interests are grounded in universal principles of racial justice.59 Thus, black
identity is reinterpreted as “a racialized group living in America that has
politicized its peoplehood for purposes of seeking racial justice.”60
Shelby’s understanding of black political solidarity also entails plurality,
conflict, and power, as can be seen in his rejection of the eliminativist denial of
racial identity. He believes that the pursuit of racial justice is something other
racial minorities and even whites should value. So, why does Shelby focus on
black political solidarity as opposed simply to anti-racist political solidarity? After
all, he recognizes that his approach would require blacks “to join multiracial
political organizations and to accept non-blacks as equal members in many of
their own institutions,”61 and that the political focus of his approach might tempt
one “to conclude that blacks should . . . reject race-specific political solidarity
altogether.”62 But ultimately, he eschews dismissing all forms of black solidarity,
given the plurality of race-based perspectives, the possible conflicts among racebased interests, and the problem of racially asymmetrical power.
The plurality of perspectives is grounded in the distinct experiences of
different racial groups. Probably most blacks have suffered the various forms of
racism associated with the “interactive kind” aspect of the social ontology of race,
which forms the unchosen conditions under which black intentional agency is
exercised. But Shelby recognizes that because “racism is not unique to the
experience of blacks,” the locus of solidarity should encompass all non-whites.
His response is rooted in the plurality of non-white perspectives and is grounded
in the diverse and divergent experiences that each non-white group might have
encountered. Thus, “antiblack racial injustice—like anti-Semitism, anti-Asian
racism, the oppression of American Indians, the denial of equal citizenship
of Latino groups, and the most recent profiling and harassment of Arab
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

247.
56.
151.
251.
140.
132.
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Americans—has features that make it unique as a form of racial subjection in the
United States.”63 A black perspective, grounded in typically black experiences,
will likely resemble other non-white perspectives and experiences, but it will
also have distinct characteristics that may motivate a more intense solidarity
among blacks than with members of other non-white groups. And despite
the best intentions of anti-racist whites who freely choose “against whiteness,”64
their socially unchosen “thin whiteness” will always grant them the agency to opt
back into whiteness should the going get tough.65
The fear that committed, anti-racist whites ultimately will reject inter-racial
solidarity is aggravated by potential conflicts between black and white interests.
Consider the issue of equal educational opportunity, one of the universalistic
principles of black political solidarity. Because poor whites suffer less residential
segregation than poor blacks, the former can attend predominately white, mixedclass schools, while the latter are relegated to schools dominated by poor
minorities. And because concentrated poverty correlates so strongly with lower
educational outcomes, poor blacks are much more likely than poor whites to
attend failing schools. Given this situation, are whites of any class likely to support
school integration programs? Prima facie, there should be no conflict of racial
interests, since integrated schools tend to raise the academic achievement for
poor black students without a concomitant decline for middle-class white
students.66 But this “Pareto-optimal” win-win outcome still can create a zero-sum
conflict of interests with respect to post-secondary education, since failing urban
schools effectively prevent most minority students from competing with suburban
white students for scarce positions at selective universities.67
Moreover, zero-sum conflicts over the tangible resource of post-secondary
education is relatively tractable compared to possible “relative-sum” conflicts
over intangible psychological goods, such as racialized self-esteem. Race
theorists note that the belief in supposedly “white” virtues such as rationality
depend on being contrasted with supposedly “black” vices such as irrationality.68
In turn, scholars of ethnic conflict suggest that when a dominant group’s identity
is threatened, members of the group may engage in economically irrational
behavior in order to harm members of the subordinate group.69 So whereas
63. Ibid., 240.
64. Ian Haney Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New York University
Press, 1996).
65. Mills, Blackness Visible, 64.
66. Gary Orfield and Susan Eaton, Dismantling Desegregation (New York: The New Press, 1996),
55–57, 343–45.
67. Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities (New York: Harper, 1991).
68. Mills, Blackness Visible, 11.
69. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985),
157–58, 175.
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zero-sum conflict over tangible resources is at least economically rational and
can be constrained when the costs of conflict are outweighed by the benefits of
cooperation, the relative-sum conflict of psychological self-esteem can hinder
cooperation even when its benefits far outweigh the costs of conflict. Thus,
interracial solidarity, while attractive and perhaps necessary for achieving racial
justice, probably never can entirely replace the need for black solidarity, given the
zero-sum and relative-sum conflicts of interest that can arise amidst interracial
political relations.
The indispensability of race-specific, black solidarity is reinforced by the
asymmetrical power relationships presently enjoyed by members of different
racial groups. Unlike the situation found within the social ontology of race, where
white power is viewed as so overwhelming as to negate non-white agency over
racial identity, the political ontology of race presupposes that power is sufficiently
dispersed among racial groups that blacks can exercise some intentional agency
over how to respond to thin blackness. But while power is dispersed, it is not
equal. Black agency is exercised under conditions of unequal power. Therefore,
Shelby argues, “non-black allies of blacks cannot reasonably expect African
Americans to forgo all forms of group solidarity given the ever-present threat of
race-based ill treatment and blacks’ relative lack of institutional power.”70
Moreover, blacks also suffer asymmetrically in terms of cultural power because
of the internalized anti-black prejudice that hinders black self-esteem and selfrespect. So while interracial coalitions with “nonblack allies and sympathizers”
may be necessary for achieving racial justice, blacks must also be autonomous
collective agents in their “struggle for self-emancipation,” in order to “enhance
. . . [their] self-esteem and self-respect.”71
This brings us full circle back to the need to justify forms of solidarity created
through intentional action. Black political solidarity is justified not only in terms
of the universal principles that it seeks to bring into being; it is also justified
through the asymmetrical power relations that blacks presently confront due to
the social ontology of race. The dispersal of power is emblematic of political
relations, particularly in democracy, that most political type of regime. But while
democracies disperse power, they do not eliminate it; and the “power over”
blacks deployed by whites and even some non-black minorities is part of what
justifies the admittedly exclusionary moment within race-specific black solidarity,
as opposed to its race-neutral, anti-racist alternative.72 While social ontology
70. Shelby, We Who are Dark, 133.
71. Ibid., 179.
72. Shelby’s recognition and affirmation of this exclusionary moment within black solidarity
differentiates his idea of political blackness from the idea of “political race” articulated by Lani Guinier
and Gerald Torres, who argue that “political race consciousness is not restricted to those people who are
phenotypically black,” in their The Miner’s Canary (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 99; Cf.
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provides some grounds to justify black political solidarity, the fact that a
justification can and should be provided is further evidence of the political
ontology of race. The political mode of blackness is not unchosen but the result
of intentional agency, and this choice can be universalistically justified,
particularly under the conditions of plurality, conflict, and asymmetrical power
that blacks experience in America.
The role of agency in the political ontology of race reveals a further problem:
the fragility of racial solidarity. Shelby notes that because black political solidarity
is a choice, “some blacks will likely defect from the collective fight to resist” racebased injustice.73 This fragility becomes more daunting because the blacks who
are the most able and have the greatest incentive to reject black political
solidarity are those who can physically pass for white and those whose class
status facilitates their assimilation into white society. Both groups can avoid the
negative experiences highlighted by interactive-kind social constructivism. While
the defection of passers can dilute the political strength of the black community
and reinforce the social structure that values whiteness, the defection of the
better off and the better educated is more debilitating. It deprives the black
political community of some (but not all) of its best potential leaders.74 Because
the biological and social ontologies of race emphasize the unchosen aspect of
race, they occlude the problem of black defection. Only the political ontology of
race, by foregrounding choice, brings the fragility of black political solidarity into
sharp relief.
The political ontology of race also illuminates the conflicts of interests and
perspectives within the black community. Because lighter skinned and higher
class blacks are less likely to bear the scars of race, their experiences and
perspectives will differ substantially from that of darker or poorer blacks. The
short-term, purely economic interests of wealthier, better educated blacks surely
will conflict with those of poorer blacks as well. Finally, if higher status blacks
tend to dominate leadership positions within the black political community, their
divergent perspectives and interests at best will undermine their ability to
represent ordinary blacks, and at worst will lead them to betray the interests of

106–07. While Shelby is not opposed to Guinier and Torres’s attempts to demonstrate how blacks and
other minorities can lead transformative social movements that not only include whites but also address
the injustices they suffer, his approach better addresses the specific vulnerabilities faced by those
individuals classified as black through social ontology. Moreover, it unclear that Guinier and Torres are
consistent in their suggestion that “political race” can fully divorce itself from the phenotypical race
associated with social ontology. They assume that multi-racial coalitions will be instigated and “led” by
blacks or other non-whites, who due to racial asymmetries in political and social power will, like the
miner’s canary, be the first to detect poisonous social conditions that will eventually affect vulnerable
whites. See The Miner’s Canary, 12, 20, 86.
73. Shelby, We Who are Dark, 155.
74. Ibid., 79–80, 85.
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ordinary blacks. The political ontology of race thus points to a recurring problem
in black political life: the absence of a solid basis for trust between black political
elites and ordinary blacks.

Beyond Eliminativism and Conservationism
During my discussion of biological ontology, I stated that instead of
eliminating race, we ought to explore the relative usefulness, uselessness, and
dangers of different race concepts. Cladistic race is arguably useful for human
evolutionary research, and socially isolated and genetically clustered race can
assist in medical care, even though they conflict with the folk racial categories
associated with the social ontology of race. And while biological ontology can be
dangerous if used for racist purposes, these dangers may remain even if we
eliminate the concept of race and may dissipate even if we retain it. Here, I will
focus on the social and political ontologies of race. I will argue that social
ontology is best used for justifying and implementing affirmative action and antidiscrimination laws, whereas political ontology best applies to race-based
political representation, which is closely entwined with the problem of trust
between elites and laypersons. Each ontology proves to be useless and perhaps
dangerous when applied to the issues best suited to the other.
The relationship between the social ontology of black race and affirmative
action and anti-discrimination law is quite straightforward. These laws are
intended to rectify the disadvantages that blacks otherwise will likely suffer
through interactive-kind constructivism. Educational affirmative action, for
example, is typically understood as a response to past interactive-kind constructivism and, therefore, as advancing either compensatory justice (compensating for
both the immediate and extended harmful effects of past discrimination against
blacks), distributive justice (recognizing types of merit that in the past were and
may still be overlooked due to poor educational opportunities); or educational
diversity (adding to the knowledge of all students by including perspectives
grounded in racially differentiated life experiences).75 Similarly, anti-discrimination law attempts to preempt interactive-kind experiences by ensuring that blacks
enjoy equal opportunities to education, employment, and housing. Affirmative
action and anti-discrimination laws are meant to benefit all blacks because the
social institution of race imposes disadvantages upon them.
But as I suggested earlier, in the case of Asian Americans, race may become
an inflated concept with diminished value, given the differences among Asian
Americans in their ethnicity, class, phenotype, and cladistic ancestry. Biological
75. On these three justifications for affirmative action, see Carl Cohen and James Sterba, Affirmative
Action and Racial Preference: A Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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ontology invalidates the notion of an Asian race as a category for cladistic
evolutionary research. The notion’s medical value in terms of socially isolated
and genetically clustered race is questionable. Social ontology might justify using
the idea of an Asian race within anti-discrimination law if the law is applied to
phenotypically similar East Asian ethnicities, but not to South Asians, some of
whom might be better categorized with people from the Middle East for this
purpose. And the notion of an Asian race may become useless or even dangerous
if applied to affirmative action, since the relative economic success of some
Asian ethnicities would obscure the disadvantages of other Asian ethnicities,
whose status under American immigration law has led to different economic and
educational opportunities.
Greater danger emerges in using the political ontology of race for purposes
of affirmative action or anti-discrimination law, even in the case of black
Americans. These policies are meant to aid all blacks, even those who oppose
racial solidarity and refuse political action aimed at securing universally
justifiable black interests. It is unthinkable that anti-discrimination law would
fail to protect blacks who intentionally reject political blackness. Even black
Republicans should not be subject to racial profiling or employment discrimination. And black Republicans should not be involuntarily excluded from
affirmative action policies, since the purpose of securing a diverse classroom is
partly to challenge stereotypes by revealing the internal diversity within a racial
group.76
But black Republicans should not expect widespread electoral support from
black voters. As Kenneth Blackwell, Michael Steele, and Lynn Swann learned in
2006, most black voters prefer white Democrats over black Republicans who,
despite their thin social race, eschew political blackness and oppose policies that
aim at equalizing educational opportunity for and counteracting poverty among
black Americans. Nor need this lesson be confined to black Republicans. Black
voters rejected a stunned Artur Davis in Alabama’s 2010 gubernatorial primary.
The outcome proves that black Democrats who oppose black interests, such as
expanding access to health care, cannot expect thin social race to translate into
political support.77 When black candidates choose against political blackness,
black voters understandably reject these candidates in favor of white candidates
who will better represent their racial interests. Political ontology, not social
ontology, clarifies this electoral phenomenon, which should prompt reformers to
revise their understanding of the theory and practice of minority political
representation.

76. See Justice O’Connor’s court opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
77. Jeff Zeleny, “Alabama Voters Reject Coalition Bid,” New York Times, June 2, 2010. http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/us/politics/03elect.html?hp (accessed June 2, 2010).
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Take Melissa Williams’s defense of race-conscious districting as a means of
securing racially descriptive representation. Grounding her argument in the social
ontology of race, she uses thin and institutional constructivism to depict blacks as
a “marginalized ascriptive group” whose membership is dichotomous (one is a
member of a discrete black or white group); involuntary (racial identity is
imposed, not chosen); and immutable (one cannot opt out of one’s ascribed
race). She contrasts racial groups with interest groups (whose membership is
continuous, voluntary, and shifting),78 and then draws on interactive-kind
constructivism to argue that blacks share common experiences, which leads to
a single shared racial perspective and a shared trust between black voters and
representatives. She concludes that blacks should represent blacks both because
the black perspective should be represented within legislative deliberation, and
because black voters will better trust black representatives, who will be equally
affected by laws that bear racially differentiated effects.79
Although Williams recognizes that descriptive representation alone does not
adequately represent marginalized racial groups and requires electoral accountability as well,80 she never asks why black voters sometimes prefer white
candidates over black candidates such as Blackwell, Steele, Swann, and Davis.
This oversight stems from her exclusive reliance on a social ontology of race. By
depicting racial identity as dichotomous and discrete, she neglects the idea of
scalar race, which opens space for agency; by depicting race as involuntary and
immutable, she forgets that African Americans have agency and, therefore, can
adopt or reject a thick understanding of political blackness; and by universalizing
the probabilistic phenomenon of interactive-kind experiences, she occludes how
light-skinned and upper-class blacks often can evade at least some of the costs of
thin blackness, which gives them not just agency but also the incentive to reject
political blackness and to betray black interests. Williams emphasizes the
unchosen social ontology of race in order to distinguish racial groups from
interest groups. But as Shelby would point out, it is the universalistic justifiability
of black political solidarity, not the unchosen condition of thin black social
identity, that distinguishes politically mobilized blacks from a mere “interest
group.”81 All of the black politicians who were mentioned earlier embodied the
social blackness that Williams believes justifies descriptive representation. Yet, all
of them eschewed political blackness by voluntarily adopting political positions that
contradicted the justifiable interests of nearly all black voters. In response, black
voters exercised their intentional agency and chose white candidates who better
78. Melissa Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998),
15–18, 50–56.
79. Ibid., 139, 167–72.
80. Ibid., 6–7.
81. Shelby, We Who are Dark, 151.
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represented their justifiable interests, despite the absence of a shared racial identity.
The theory of political ontology, not social ontology, clarifies this phenomenon.
Political ontology also can help one make sense of recent developments in
voting rights law. In 1993, the case of Shaw v. Reno82 stimulated widespread
interest in minority voting rights. But the legal status of the district challenged in
this case was not settled until 2001, when the Supreme Court, in Hunt v. Cromartie,
upheld the district as a partly partisan rather than a purely racial gerrymander.83
According to the Court, although race clearly played a role in the construction of
this district, the intention was to encompass not blacks per se but black
Democrats, who are more loyal partisans than are white Democrats, who
sometimes support Republican candidates. This opinion squares poorly with a
social ontology of race, but it is compatible with the logic of the political ontology
of race, according to which African Americans can choose how to respond to
their unchosen thin racial identity. While African Americans cannot choose their
thin racial identity, they can choose to vote Democratic on the grounds that many
politicians who are Democrats at least partially support blacks’ justifiable racial
interests, while Republicans, even black ones, almost always oppose them.
This brings us back to Barack Obama. As the epigram at the beginning of this
essay suggests, Obama’s membership within the black community was never
assumed by blacks. Not only was his mother white, but his father was Kenyan, not
African American; and he was raised by his white maternal grandparents. As a
result, Obama would not be categorized as African American, which, according
to the socially isolated biological ontology, is a genetically isolated population
created through the application of anti-miscegenation laws to the descendants of
African slaves brought to the United States. Of course, Obama would be black
according to social ontology. His appearance fits the thin constructivist account
of social black identity, and he claims to have encountered the negative
experiences typical of blacks under interactive kind constructivism. On the other
hand, his bi-racial ancestry, combined with his cultural upbringing in a white
family, educational achievement, and class status allow him to opt out of political
blackness. As a result, Obama has repeatedly confronted the charge that he is not
“black enough.” This charge first appeared nationally in 2007 at the beginning of
his Presidential campaign and has recently reappeared in Cornel West’s charge
that all Obama “has known culturally is white . . . that is his cultural formation.”84
West’s generalizations about Obama’s cultural whiteness are linked to doubts
about his political blackness and to charges that the President has not adequately
82. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
83. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
84. Chris Hedges, “The Obama Deception: Why Cornel West went Ballistic,” Truthdig, May 16, 2011,
http://www.truthdig.com/report/page2/the_obama_deception_why_cornel_west_went_ballistic_20110516/
(accessed June 23, 2011).
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defended black interests, particularly in response to the financial crisis and
resulting economic recession.
These doubts about Obama’s political or cultural blackness do not seem to
plague ordinary black Americans. Black Americans remain Obama’s most
reliable political supporters, with 83–96 percent of them approving of his
performance as President since his inauguration through mid-June of 2011.85
When a 2009 Pew survey asked, “Do you mostly think of Obama as a black person
or mostly as a person of mixed race,” majorities of all Americans (52 percent), of
white Americans (53 percent), and of Latinos/as (61 percent) chose “mixed
race”, whereas most blacks answered “black” (55 percent).86 Among the various
factors that contributed to this divergence in perception was the belief among
blacks that Obama had chosen political blackness. When the same Pew survey
asked, “Does Obama share values and interests of black people in this country?”
blacks were the group with the strongest affirmation. Approximately 63 percent of
the black respondents stated that Obama shared “a lot” of black values and
interests, and only 32 percent said he shared only “some” black values and
interests. Conversely, less than half of the white respondents (40 percent) and the
Latino/a respondents (42 percent) said that Obama shared “a lot” rather than just
“some” black values and interests.87 Finally, more blacks (60 percent) than whites
(57 percent) said that Obama is “paying . . . the right amount of attention to the
concerns of blacks,” whereas equally small proportions of both racial groups
(10 percent) said that he was paying “too little.”88
Obama has not advocated for black interests as aggressively as some
progressives, such as West, wish. But as Melissa Harris-Perry points out, tenured
black academics like she and West “are not meaningfully accountable,” whereas
“President Obama, as an elected official, can, in fact, be voted out of his job.”89
According to David Canon, black representatives who are elected from majorityor plurality-black districts with large white minorities tend to adopt a balancing
strategy in office that accommodates the interests of both the black and the white
constituents to whom they are accountable.90 If we remember that Obama is
85. Gallup Daily Tracking Poll of Presidential Approval http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/
Presidential-Job-Approval-Center.aspx (accessed June 23, 2011).
86. Pew Research Center, “A Year after Obama’s Election: Blacks Upbeat about Black Progress,
Prospects,” January 12, 2010, 59. Pdf file of the full report available online at http://pewresearch.org/
pubs/1459/year-after-obama-election-black-public-opinion (accessed June 23 2011).
87. Pew Research Center, “A Year after Obama’s Election,” 53.
88. Pew Research Center, “A Year after Obama’s Election,” 54. Interestingly, the respondants most
frustrated with the amount of attention that Obama was paying to their concerns were Hispanics, with
equal proportions (42 percent) saying that he was paying “the right amount” and “too little” attention.
89. Melissa Harris-Perry, “Cornel West v. Barack Obama,” The Nation, May 17, 2011, http://
www.thenation.com/blog/160725/cornel-west-v-barack-obama (accessed June 23, 2011).
90. David Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1999), 48.
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accountable to a national constituency—the American electorate—that is
majority white, then his adoption of racial even-handedness over aggressive
advocacy for black interests becomes more understandable. Political conditions,
not cultural whiteness, probably explains the moderation in Obama’s racial
policies that so frustrates black progressives like West.
It is possible that ordinary black Americans take Obama’s political situation
into consideration when judging him, given that they have supported him more
than some other black politicians, such as Davis, Blackwell, Steele, and Swann.
The latter politicians have social backgrounds that are more typically black
American and less “culturally white” than is the President’s background, yet they
have intentionally moved further to the right than has Obama in their hopes of
being elected by majority-white statewide constituencies. Black voters probably
see Obama as defending black interests (and intentionally choosing political
blackness) as much as he can, given the large constituency that he represents. As
Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, when responding to the original charges that Obama was
not black enough, put it,
Obama is married to a black woman. He goes to a black church. He’s worked
with poor people on the South Side of Chicago, and still lives there. That
someone given the escape valve of biraciality would choose to be black,
would see some beauty in his darker self and still care more about health care
and public education than reparations and Confederate flags, is just too much
for many . . . to comprehend.91
In the end, Obama has embraced political blackness more than he has rejected
it. Black voters realize this. The notion of political ontology helps us understand
what makes him appear black to African-American voters. So now we are in a
position to say confidently that, at least in the eyes of most black Americans, on
November 4, 2008, America elected Barack Obama to be its first black president.
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